The hidden costs of nudging: Experimental evidence from reminders in fundraising by Trier Damgaard, Mette & Gravert, Christina
 Department of Economics 
School of Business, Economics and Law at University of Gothenburg  
Vasagatan 1, PO Box 640, SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden  
+46 31 786 0000, +46 31 786 1326 (fax) 
www.handels.gu.se    info@handels.gu.se 
      
 
 
 
WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS 
 
 
No 650 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The hidden costs of nudging: Experimental evidence 
from reminders in fundraising 
 
Mette Trier Damgaard & Christina Gravert 
 
 
 
March 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1403-2473 (print) 
ISSN 1403-2465 (online) 
 
 
 
The hidden costs of nudging: Experimental evidence
from reminders in fundraising∗
Mette Trier Damgaard†
Aarhus University
Christina Gravert‡
University of Gothenburg
March 14, 2016
Abstract
We document the hidden costs of one of the most policy-relevant nudges, reminders. Send-
ing reminders, while proven effective in facilitating behavior change, may come at a cost for
both senders and receivers. Using a large scale field experiment with a charity, we find that
reminders increase donations, but they also substantially increase unsubscriptions from the
mailing list. To understand this novel finding, we develop a dynamic model of donation and
unsubscription behavior with limited attention which is tested in reduced-form using a sec-
ond field experiment. We also estimate our model structurally to perform a welfare analysis,
showing that reminders are welfare diminishing for the potential donors as non-givers incur
a welfare loss of $2.35 for every reminder. The net benefit of every reminder to the char-
ity is $0.18. Our evaluation shows the need to evaluate nudges on their intended as well as
unintended consequences.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, “nudging” policies have gained increased attention both from practitioners and
from academics. Nudges are small deliberate changes to the decision environment designed to
increase privately and socially beneficial behavior such as healthy habits, savings, environmental
protection, or charitable giving without altering prices or taking away any options. Nudging inter-
ventions often require low implementation costs and induce significant positive behavioral change,
which has fueled enthusiasm for its use among policy makers. However, evaluating the success of
a nudge on the magnitude of behavioral change and implementation cost alone could be misleading
from a social welfare perspective.
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of one of the most frequently applied
and well-known nudges: reminders. Reminders are designed to bring a particular decision or task
to recipients’ attention and as a result induce behavioral change. A large number of recent papers
have shown that reminders can influence behavior in the context of gym attendance (Calzolari
and Nardotto, 2014), adherence to medical treatments (Vervloet et al., 2012; Altmann and Traxler,
2014), personal savings (Karlan et al., 2012), take-up of social benefits (Bhargava and Manoli,
2015), electricity consumption (Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Gilbert and Zivin, 2014), and giving to
charitable organizations (Huck and Rasul, 2010; Sonntag and Zizzo, 2015).
Technological improvements over the past few decades have led to low distributional cost of
reminders, implying that reminders are likely to become even more common in coming years. This
makes it relevant to explore whether there are costs to using reminders.
Reminders impose time and effort costs on recipients as well as psychological costs such as
annoyance and guilt. These costs should be taken into account when evaluating the nudge and
could constitute a “hidden cost of nudging”. A cost inducing reminder only increases the utility
of the recipient if it prompts a behavioral change. Hence, if many people are nudged, but only
few change their behavior, then the welfare effects of the nudge could be negative. The annoyance
costs could lead recipients to opt out of the reminder and block the communication channel.
In addition to the potential and immediate costs for recipients, reminders can also lead to long-
term costs for the sender if recipients unsubscribe from the mailing list. The sender therefore has
to weigh current returns against long-term costs due to the loss of subscribers. Depending on his
discount rate, the costs might outweigh the benefits despite the low distributional costs.
We examine the reminder effect, including the hidden costs, in the context of charitable giving.
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In particular, we consider a revealed preference measure of the “annoyance costs”: unsubscribing
from reminder messages.
To simultaneously understand giving and unsubscription behavior, we develop a dynamic model
of warm-glow giving where individuals incur an annoyance cost every time the charity sends a
fundraising appeal. Annoyance costs can be psychological costs such as guilt or perceived pres-
sure or practical costs such as time and attention. Every period, individuals decide whether to
give or not if reminded about the donation possibility (Andreoni, 1989, 1990; DellaVigna et al.,
2012). In addition, individuals have the option to unsubscribe from future communication, making
dynamic considerations relevant. By unsubscribing they avoid future annoyance costs associated
with reminder messages, but they also risk missing future opportunities to donate. We model for-
getting by incorporating inattention similar to Karlan et al. (2012); Taubinsky (2013), and Calzolari
and Nardotto (2014). Our model predicts a higher rate of giving and a higher unsubscription rate
in response to reminders. We show that the unsubscription decision further depends on whether
people evaluate the option value of staying subscribed to be sufficiently large to justify anticipated
future annoyance costs.
We test these predictions in two field experiments with a charity. In field experiments, partic-
ipants are not aware that their behavior is being observed, and we therefore observe their natural
reactions. The first experiment tests the prediction that reminders increase unsubscriptions by
sending solicitation e-mails to approximately 17,000 warm-list donors, i.e., individuals who have
donated to the charity in the recent past. Individuals in the control group receive one e-mail asking
them to donate within ten days. People in the treatment group receive the same e-mail and an addi-
tional reminder one week later. In line with the predictions of the model, we find that the reminder
significantly increases donations but also significantly increases unsubscriptions from the mailing
list.
The second field experiment tests the prediction that the unsubscription choice is determined
by the option value of subscribing and anticipated annoyance costs. A sample of 43,000 previous
donors receives a regular solicitation e-mail from the charity. With the exception of one sentence,
the solicitation e-mails are identical across our three treatment groups. In the control treatment,
potential donors are made aware that the charity sends an e-mail to individuals on the mailing list
approximately once per month. This is to fix expectations of how often people should expect to
receive e-mails from the charity, and it allows potential donors to form beliefs about future an-
noyance costs. In our Low Frequency treatment, we exogenously decrease anticipated annoyance
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costs relative to the control treatment by announcing that the charity will only send one e-mail
in the next three months. The model predicts that individuals in the Low Frequency group are
less likely to unsubscribe than individuals in the control group. In the Future Benefit treatment,
we increase the option value of staying on the list by announcing that next month an anonymous
donor will make a donation for every person on the mailing list who donates in response to the
next e-mail. Compared to the control group, this message should make individuals less willing to
unsubscribe because the utility from donating in the next period is increased. Four weeks later, all
participants received the same e-mail about a donation opportunity, regardless of which treatment
they were assigned to.
In line with our model predictions, we find that announcing a reduced frequency of mailings
significantly decreases the number of unsubscriptions relative to the control treatment. Announcing
a future matching opportunity also reduces the number of unsubscriptions, but this result is only
marginally significant. While the main outcome of interest is the decision to unsubscribe, we also
measure how these nudges affect the decision to donate. The treatments have no effect on the
decision to donate or the donated amount which is also consistent with our model.
Using the results from the second experiment, we structurally estimate the annoyance costs of
being solicited through e-mail. We then use these estimates to conduct a welfare analysis from
the perspective of the recipients. For the potential donor, there is a trade-off between annoyance
costs and warm-glow from remembering to give. We estimate the costs associated with receiving
a reminder to 12.95 DKK ($2.35). This can be interpreted as the willingness to pay not to receive
a reminder, such as buying a sophisticated e-mail ad-blocker. Since donations are relatively rare in
our sample, this implies that a reminder on average is welfare diminishing for potential donors.
We then consider the perspective of the charity by estimating the impact of a reminder on dona-
tions, using individual level donation data from the first experiment. For the charity the trade-off is
between an immediate increase in donations and a future loss of donations from unsubscribing in-
dividuals. Since we only solicit individuals who have donated to the charity in the past, the charity
loses former donors, albeit donors who on average gave at slightly lower levels than the people who
stay subscribed. After unsubscribing, some individuals continue to donate to the charity through
other channels (i.e. text messages, bank transfers, in store donations), but at significantly lower
levels than while they were on the mailing list. When accounting for the long-term effects of un-
subscriptions on giving, we find that the net effect for the charity of sending a reminder is just
1 DKK ($0.18) per potential donor.
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Our paper adds to several strands of literature. First, it presents evidence on the hidden costs
of nudging that have been mostly neglected until now. Previous studies on reminders do not dis-
tinguish between an effect on behavior and an effect on welfare (Macharia et al., 1992; Vervloet
et al., 2012; Karlan et al., 2012; Gilbert and Zivin, 2014; Huck and Rasul, 2010; Sonntag and
Zizzo, 2015; Calzolari and Nardotto, 2014; Allcott and Rogers, 2014). However, a small num-
ber of studies have looked at the welfare effects of other choice enhancing policies (Carroll et al.,
2009; Bernheim et al., 2015; Bhattacharya et al., 2015; Murooka and Schwarz, 2016). Allcott and
Kessler (2015) present an experimental design to evaluate the welfare effects of social comparisons
in reducing energy consumption by eliciting the willingness to pay for the nudge. They show that
ignoring “non-energy costs” such as psychological costs (like guilt or shame) and time costs for
turning off lights and adjusting thermostats overstates the welfare gain of the nudge by a factor of
five. Chesterley (2015) makes a related point in his paper analyzing the theoretical drawbacks of
default choices. Handel (2013) shows that nudges to overcome inertia in health insurance markets
could exacerbate adverse selection and thus lead to an overall welfare loss through the nudge. In
contrast to the other studies, we estimate welfare effects both for the one nudging and for the one
being nudged.
Second, our paper provides new insights on social pressure costs which have been discussed
in the “avoiding-the-ask” literature (Dana et al., 2007; Andreoni et al., 2011; DellaVigna et al.,
2012; Knutsson et al., 2013; Cain et al., 2014; Trachtman et al., 2015). By observing the decisions
of opting in or out of a possibility to donate, we observe the costs of the nudge. If the social
pressure/annoyance costs are too high in our experiment, people unsubscribe from the mailing list,
while they avoid opening the door or tick the opt-out box in DellaVigna et al. (2012).
Third, the model we propose in this paper is an addition to the theoretical literature on the effect
of reminders on attention (Karlan et al., 2012; Taubinsky, 2013; Calzolari and Nardotto, 2014).
These papers assume that individuals have a decaying attention function, which can be reset to full
attention through the use of a reminder. Although all authors agree that there seems to be a natural
upper limit on the number of reminders that should be sent out, their models nevertheless predict
an increasing utility in the number of reminders.
In terms of its methodology, our paper is part of a growing literature on structural behavioral
economics which estimate behavioral models using non-experimental (Conlin et al., 2007; Laibson
et al., 2007) or experimental field data (DellaVigna et al., 2012). A close link between the theo-
retical model and the field experiment is advocated in this literature (Card et al., 2011; Harrison,
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2014).
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our model, while sec-
tion 3 introduces the design of the two experiments and ties testable predictions derived from our
model to their treatments. Section 4 describes our sample and the implementation of our experi-
ment. Section 5 presents the reduced-form results from our experiments, and section 6 estimates
the structural parameters of our model. Section 7 presents our welfare analysis and section 8
concludes.
2 Model
Building on the work by Andreoni (1989, 1990), we present a dynamic T -period model of giving
and unsubscription behavior which includes a fixed cost of each solicitation to the potential donor.
The potential donor chooses both whether to give and whether to unsubscribe.1
2.1 The general setup
We consider a repeated interaction between a charity and a warm-list donor who is asked to give
via e-mails. We refer to the potential donor simply as “the donor” and to the solicitations as “the
messages”. In every period t ∈ {1,2, ...,T}, the donor must decide if he wants to donate and if so,
how much. In addition, whenever he receives a message, he decides if he wants to unsubscribe
from future messages sent by the charity.
We assume that the donor receives warm-glow utility from every donation gt ≥ 0 to the charity.
We denote the warm-glow utility from giving by v(gt)where v′(·)> 0, v′′(·)< 0, and limgt→∞ v′(gt)=
0.2 We model the cost of giving by the function c(·) where c′(·)> 0 and assume that this captures
all costs associated with giving, including the reduction in consumption utility, transaction costs,
and opportunity costs. The net donation utility from giving gt is therefore
d(gt ,at) = atv(gt)− c(gt)
1The technical details, including proofs, are provided in the Supplementary Appendix.
2Note that although we refer to it as warm-glow utility, v(·) could also capture prestige or utility from conforming
to social norms, and the model could easily be adapted to include pure altruism.
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where at is the weight on warm-glow utility. We further assume that d′′gg(gt ,at) < 0, d(0,at) = 0,
and d(gt ,at) ∈ L1, i.e., the integral of the absolute value of d(gt ,at) is finite. The law of motion
for at is given by an AR(1) process3
at = µ+ρat−1+ εt
where εt ∼ IID(0,σ2) on a finite support [−M,M], i.e., M < ∞.
To capture the effect of reminders, we assume that the donor has limited attention and therefore
only remembers the donation problem with probability θ ∈ [0,1) in every period. If the donor is
attentive and remembers the donation decision, he gives an amount gt ≥ 0 to the charity. On the
other hand, if he is inattentive and forgets about the donation decision, then gt = 0. Similar to
the inattention models by Karlan et al. (2012) and Taubinsky (2013), we assume that the donor is
sophisticated and therefore aware of his inattention.
We assume that any message from the charity serves as a reminder of the donation problem.
We let pt denote the probability that the charity sends a message in period t. The donor receives
the message if he has not unsubscribed in any of the previous periods. If the donor is subscribed to
messages in period t and the charity sends a message, then the donor always recalls the donation
problem, otherwise the donation problem is only remembered with with probability θ .4 Hence,
subscribing to the mailing list at the beginning of period t, increases the probability that the donor
remembers the donation problem.
We let Λ denote a cost to the donor of receiving a message from the charity. This cost can be
thought of as an effort cost of looking at the message or a moral cost of feeling guilty for having
to be reminded. We refer to this cost as an “annoyance cost”, which for simplicity is assumed to
be constant. We also assume that any type of message generates the same fixed cost, i.e., original
solicitations and reminders induce the same cost.
If the donor receives a message in period t, he also has the option to unsubscribe ut = 1 or not
ut = 0 from the mailing list. The decision to unsubscribe is considered irreversible and eliminates
all future messages from the charity, i.e., ut+k = 1 if ut = 1 for all k ∈ {1,2, ...,T − t}. It follows
3Note that the AR(1) process introduces time-variation in the weight on warm-glow utility and that a deterministic
process for at would lead to a static problem where the donor either unsubscribes in period t = 1 or never unsubscribes.
4We note that θ can capture both natural recall and cues other than direct messages, e.g., general advertisements.
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that if pt(1−ut−1) = 1, the donor is subscribed at the beginning of period t and receives a message
from the charity.
Under these assumptions, the donor’s inter-temporal optimization problem in period t is
max
gt ,ut
E
[
T−t
∑
τ=0
δ τ
[
pt+τ(1−ut−1+τ)(d(gt+τ ,at+τ)−Λ)+(1− pt+τ(1−ut−1+τ))θd(gt+τ ,at+τ)
]∣∣∣∣∣ Ωt
]
(1)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the inter-temporal discount factor and E[· | Ωt ] denotes the expectation given
period t information. The information set Ωt includes {aτ}tτ=1, meaning that the donor knows the
weight he assigned to warm-glow utility in current and past periods.
A few remarks regarding the dynamic structure of the model are in place. First, we assume that
donors have a finite horizon T to capture that people are unlikely to plan years ahead when it comes
to charitable giving. In addition, a fixed horizon T allow us to investigate the effect of varying the
horizon. Second, we do not assume an inter-temporal budget constraint for the maximization
problem. This simplifying assumption is made for tractability and because in the case of charitable
giving it seems unlikely that the inter-temporal budget constraint would be binding. Prediction 5
below follows directly from this assumption and therefore allow us to test this feature of the model.
When solving the model we assume that the donor is rational in the sense that he knows his
preferences, the timing of events, how he will respond to messages in future periods, and forms
rational expectations regarding the charity’s reminder strategy, i.e, {pt}Tt=1. If a donor has not
unsubscribed in period t but does not receive a message because pt = 0, then he has no opportunity
to unsubscibe, and we therefore let ut = 0. In addition, it is assumed that the donor does not
unsubscribe when he is indifferent between doing so or not.5 Similarly, we assume that the donor
does not give anything if he is indifferent between doing so or not.
2.2 Giving and unsubscribing
The optimal donation and unsubscription decisions are obtained by backwards induction, and both
have classic threshold properties. As illustrated in Figure 1, a donor with a sufficiently low real-
5One can think of this assumption as capturing some tiny cost of pressing the unsubscribe button that tips the
balance in favor of not unsubscribing. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as a small default bias.
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ization of at unsubscribes, while a donor with a high realization of at makes a donation. Lemma 1
gives the threshold property for the optimal donation choice.
Lemma 1. Conditional on remembering, the optimal donation decision g∗(at) is weakly increasing
in at and has the threshold property: (i) g∗(at) = 0 for at ≤ a¯≡ c
′(0)
v′(0); and (ii) g
∗(at)> 0 for at > a¯.
Lemma 1 follows directly from the maximization problem in Equation (1), and the assumption
that giving in period t only affects utility in this period. Hence, conditional on remembering the
donation problem, the donor only takes into account his current generosity, as captured by at ,
when choosing whether to make a positive donation. The amount donated is weakly increasing in
at .6 Notice that the threshold a¯ is constant and that time variation in giving solely originates from
variability in at .
Figure 1: Optimal unsubscription and donation thresholds
Notes: The optimal donation and unsubscription thresholds when εt follows
a truncated normal distribution.
Lemma 2 gives the corresponding threshold property for the optimal unsubscription choice.
Recall that M is the upper bound on the support for the innovation in the AR(1)-process for at .
6This is similar to the predictions of usual static models of giving in Andreoni (1989, 1990) and DellaVigna et al.
(2012).
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Lemma 2. Conditional on receiving a message from the charity in period t and for M sufficiently
large, the optimal unsubscription decision u∗t (at) has the threshold property: (i) u∗t (at) = 1 for
at < at; and (ii) u
∗
t (at) = 0 for at ≥ at . The threshold at is increasing in t.
Lemma 2 follows from exploiting the finding in Lemma 1 that g∗ only depends on at and not on
current or future unsubscription or donation choices. This property of our model eases tractability
and implies that the model solution has a sequential structure: the donor simply conditions on the
optimal donation rule when making his unsubscription decision. More formally, for a given at ,
he first obtains {g∗τ}Tτ=t and then computes {u∗τ}Tτ=t backwards. The unsubscription problem is
then reduced to an optimal stopping problem with one state variable at and one control variable
ut ∈ A = {0,1}. Its value function is given by a standard Bellman equation, and it is well-known
that the solution has a threshold property (see for instance Rust (1987)).7
The lower threshold at can be interpreted as an optimal unsubscription boundary similar to
the optimal exercise boundary for American options.8 In our context, the donor unsubscribes if
he expects future annoyance costs to be larger than the warm-glow utility foregone by not being
reminded in the future. This latter effect is referred to as “the option value” of subscribing. The
boundary at increases with time as the value of subscribing decreases over time given a finite
horizon T .
The threshold property in Lemma 2 implies that a donor unsubscribes from future messages if
he gets a message and his realization of at is sufficiently low. Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2,
we obtain the following proposition for the effect of reminders:
Proposition 1. A reminder increases both the unconditional probability that the donor makes a
donation and the unconditional probability that he unsubscribes.
We note that current utility is unaffected by the unsubscription choice in this period because the
current annoyance cost cannot be avoided. Hence, the current unsubscription choice only affects
the utility in future periods. We summarize these observations in the following proposition which
ties the current unsubscription decision to expectations about the future:
7Formal proofs verifying these results in our setting are deferred to the Supplementary Appendix. The technical
requirement that the bound M (on the support for εt in the AR(1) process) must be sufficiently large is not particularly
restrictive as M can be chosen arbitrarily large.
8For instance, the holder of an American put option exercises his right to sell the option if its value falls below a
critical value, which is referred to as the optimal exercise boundary (Kim, 1990; Jacka, 1991; Carr et al., 1992, among
others).
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Proposition 2. The unsubscription choice of the donor depends on the option value of subscribing
and expected future annoyance costs.
3 Experimental design and testable predictions
To test our model, and Proposition 1 and 2 in particular, we design two field experiments carried
out via e-mail. The following sub-sections describe these experiments, their treatments, and derive
testable predictions which hold for all specifications of warm-glow utility and costs given the stated
assumptions.
3.1 Experiment I: A targeted reminder
Experiment I tests Proposition 1 that reminders increase donations at the expense of more unsub-
scriptions. The experiment is carried out in a setting with infrequent e-mail communication from
the charity to donors. Potential donors are randomized into two treatments:9
• Control I (CI): A solicitation e-mail presents the cause and informs that for every person
who donates within the next 10 days an anonymous donor will donate an additional 10 DKK
(approx. 1.8 USD).
• Targeted Reminder (TR): In addition to the first e-mail an unannounced targeted reminder
is sent seven days later to anyone who has not donated or unsubscribed within the first week.
The reminder contains no new information.
Given the specific treatments, Proposition 1 can be translated into testable predictions. In both
treatments, we send an initial donation request in period t = 1. In addition, potential donors in the
Targeted Reminder treatment receive an unannounced targeted reminder in period t = 2 if they do
not give or unsubscribe in response to the initial message. Let u jt and g
j
t denote the unsubscription
and donation decision, respectively, in period t for individuals in treatment j where j ∈ {CI;T R}.
Prediction 1. The unconditional probability of giving is higher in the Targeted Reminder treat-
ment than in the Control I treatment: P(gT R1 + g
T R
2 > 0) > P(g
CI
1 + g
CI
2 > 0). In particular, the
9A number of other cross-randomized treatments were implemented in parallel and are described in detail in
Damgaard and Gravert (2014). This paper focuses on the two treatments that allow us to isolate the effect of the
targeted reminder.
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unconditional probability of giving in period t = 2 is larger in the Targeted Reminder treatment
than in the Control I treatment: P(gT R2 > 0)> P(g
CI
2 > 0).
Donors in the two treatments are equally likely to give in period t = 1. However, donors in
Control I do not receive the targeted reminder and are inattentive to the donation problem in period
t = 2 with probability θ . They may therefore fail to give in period t = 2 even if their realization of
a2 is above the upper threshold a¯. Potential donors in the Targeted Reminder treatment remember
the donation problem in period t = 2 with certainty and are therefore more likely to donate in
period t = 2. Taking the two periods together, the probability of giving is therefore greater in the
Targeted Reminder treatment than in Control I.10
Next we consider the probability of unsubscribing.
Prediction 2. The unconditional probability of unsubscribing is higher in the Targeted Reminder
treatment than in the Control I treatment: P(uT R2 = 1)> P(u
CI
2 = 1).
Donors in the Targeted Reminder get two messages that they can unsubscribe from, while those
in Control I only have one possibility to unsubscribe.
3.2 Experiment II: Changing the option value of subscribing
Experiment II tests Proposition 2 that unsubscription choices are affected by the option value of
subscribing and beliefs about future annoyance cost. We therefore consider treatments that either
i) change the option value of subscribing by announcing a future “matching” opportunity, or ii)
change the future expected annoyance costs by announcing a temporary reduction in the frequency
of messages. The experiment is carried out in a setting with e-mails from the charity to donors
approximately once a month.
Potential donors are randomized equally into the following three treatments:11
• Control II (CII): A solicitation e-mail informs of the cause and contains the information
that subscribers usually receive one e-mail a month from the charity.
• Future Benefit (FB): The same solicitation e-mail as in Control II is used with the informa-
tion that subscribers usually receive one e-mail a month plus an announcement that in the
10This prediction of the model is similar to the prediction in Huck and Rasul (2010).
11We cross-randomize the receivers who participated in Experiment I and the new subscribers into the treatments of
Experiment II to avoid any confounds with the first experiment.
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next e-mail an anonymous donor will donate a healthy meal to a poor child for every person
on the mailing list who donates in response to the second e-mail.
• Low Frequency (LF): The same solicitation e-mail as in Control II is used with the infor-
mation that subscribers usually receive one e-mail a month plus an announcement that in the
coming three months subscribers will only receive one e-mail from the charity.
To derive testable predictions related to Proposition 2, we let one period correspond to one
month. Hence, pt = 1 for all t in the Control II and Future Benefit treatments, as the charity sends
a message every month and potential donors are made aware of this. In the Future Benefit treatment
potential donors are told in period t = 1 that a lead donor will give a “match” worth m> 0 for every
person on the mailing list who donates at least X > 0 in period t = 2. Assume that the donors get
warm-glow utility from the sponsored amount m, then donors in the Future Benefit treatment on
the mailing list in period t = 2 (i.e. uFB1 = 0) get donation utility
dm(g2,a2) =
{
a2v(g2+m)− c(g2) if g2 ≥ X
a2v(g2))− c(g2) otherwise.
Donors in the Future Benefit treatment who are not on the mailing list at time t = 2 get the standard
donation utility, i.e., d(g2,a2) = a2v(g2)− c(g2). Assume that donors in the Control II treatment
believe that m = 0, and assume that the utility in all other periods is unaffected by the announce-
ment of the match. This leads to a prediction about the the relative size of unsubscription rates in
the Future Benefit and Control II treatments.
Prediction 3. The unconditional probability of unsubscribing in period t = 1 is lower in the Future
Benefit treatment than in the Control II treatment : P(uFB1 = 1)< P(u
CII
1 = 1).
To understand this result, first note that the match m > 0 reduces the cost of achieving a certain
level of warm-glow utility for donations above the threshold X and thus dm(g∗2,a2) ≥ d(g∗2,a2).
Hence for a given value of a1, the expected option value of remaining subscribed (at least until the
next period) is greater in the Future Benefit treatment than in the Control II treatment. The model
therefore predicts that the unsubscription rate is smaller in the Future Benefit treatment than in the
Control II treatment.
To derive a similar prediction for the Low Frequency and Control II treatments, note that donors
in the Low Frequency treatment in period t = 1 are told that they will only receive one message in
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the next three months, i.e., p2 = p3 = p4 = 13 and p j = 1 for all j > 4. This leads to a prediction
about the size of the unconditional unsubscription rates.
Prediction 4. For P(at > a¯) sufficiently low, the unconditional probability of unsubscribing in
period t = 1 is lower in the Low Frequency treatment than in the Control II treatment: P(uLF1 =
1)< P(uCII1 = 1).
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The Low Frequency treatment implies fewer
messages that impose annoyance costs on potential donors. At the same time potential donors
are less likely to remember to give in cases where giving is optimal, and this could make it less
valuable to remain on the list. It turns out that if there is a relatively small probability of giving, i.e.,
P(at > a¯) sufficiently low, then the effect of lower annoyance outweighs the effect of foregoing
opportunities to donate. This therefore implies that the unconditional probability of unsubscribing
is lower in the Low Frequency treatment than in the Control II treatment.12
In terms of giving behavior, the model predicts no differences across treatments:
Prediction 5. The unconditional probability of giving in period t = 1 is the same in the Control II
treatment, the Low Frequency treatment, and the Future Benefit treatment: P(gCII1 > 0) = P(g
LF
1 >
0) = P(gFB1 > 0).
This prediction arises directly from the assumption that giving is not constrained by an inter-
temporal budget constraint. Effectively, Prediction 5 is a test of the validity of this assumption.13
4 Sample and implementation
We collaborated with the Danish charity DanChurchAid (DCA) to run the field experiments in the
summers of 2013 and 2015. DCA is one of the largest NGO’s in Denmark with a total revenue of
0.57 billion DKK in 2013 (DanChurch Aid, 2013). The total annual revenue of charities in Den-
12In a setting as ours with no social pressure costs, it seems reasonable to assume that P(at > a¯) is small. In Control
I we find very little giving without asking. This is similar to the results reported by DellaVigna et al. (2012) who find
virtually no giving via regular mail or internet but only giving through door-to-door solicitation.
13Intuitively, it implies that there is no inter-temporal substitution of giving as only the current realization of at
matters for the decision to give.
14
mark is estimated to be about 2 billion DKK.14 DCA mostly implements and supports emergency
and development programs in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Central America.
Our samples for the two experiments consist of warm-list donors who have provided their e-
mail address to the charity. The mailing list is constantly updated as new subscribers are added
and others unsubscribe or close their e-mail accounts. A total of 11,324 individuals (roughly
one third of the combined sample) participated in both experiments. Our samples do not include
regular donors with payments to the charity setup as a monthly Direct Debit at the time of the
experiments because the automatic nature of these payments alter the attention considerations. E-
mail communication from the charity was relatively uncommon prior to the first experiment and
varied depending on which campaigns donors had previously responded to. However, at the time
of the second experiment, donors on the mailing list had received e-mail messages from the charity
approximately every month for the past year. In addition to e-mails, the charity uses several other
communication channels to reach potential donors, including mass media, social media, regular
door-to-door solicitations, and text messages solicitations. DCA also runs 125 charity shops across
Denmark, and it has partnered with an electricity provider to offer people the opportunity to donate
via their electricity bill. All donations are tax deductible, which is stated in all correspondence.
4.1 Implementation of the experiments
The initial e-mail in Experiment I was sent on the 28th of May 2013, and the reminder was sent
on the 4th of June 2013. Our sample for the first experiment consisted of 17,391 donors, and
approximately half the sample was randomly allocated to each of the two treatments (Targeted
Reminder and Control I). Personal characteristics are similar across the two treatments as shown in
Table 1. The style of the e-mail was similar to the style of other communication sent by the charity,
and the e-mail solicited money for poor children in Africa (see Figure A3 for a screenshot).15
For Experiment II, 43,591 donors received a solicitation e-mail on the 9th of July 2015. The
e-mail was in the style of regular solicitations by the charity and announced the possibility of
supporting the opening of a store selling surplus food in order to reduce food waste and raise
money for the charity (see Figure A4 for a screenshot). People were asked to donate money in
steps of 100 DKK, which constituted the “price” of a “share” in the store, but the shares did not
14Deloitte and the Danish Fundraising Association (ISOBRO) estimate that ISOBRO members had a combined
revenue of 1.8 billion DKK and accounted for more than 75% of the market in 2013 (ISOBRO and Deloitte, 2014).
15Translations of the experimental material are in the Supplementary Appendix.
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entitle them to any ownership or rights regarding the store, i.e., it was a pure donation. Donors
did however receive a physical printout of a share in the mail for every 100 DKK donation they
made.16 To avoid self-selection into opening the e-mail, all three treatments had the same subject
line “Stop Food Waste”.
A second e-mail was sent out a month after Experiment II to measure the medium term ef-
fects of the intervention and provide the matching opportunity announced in the Future Benefit
treatment. More information on this e-mail and the effect it had can be found in Appendix C.
We obtained a good balance across the treatments in Experiment II, as shown in Table 1. Given
the natural development in the e-mail list of the charity, some of the summary statistics have
changed between the first and the second experiment. The average age is lower (38 versus 46
years), and the average amount donated at the last donation through any channel has decreased
from around 300 DKK to around 190 DKK. Other characteristics are very similar to those of the
first experiment.
4.1.1 The unsubscribe link and landing page
It was possible to unsubscribe from the mailing list by clicking a button at the bottom of every
e-mail. The design and visibility of the button was identical in all e-mails. If donors clicked on the
unsubscribe button, they were directed to a website hosted by the charity, a so-called landing page.
In Experiment I the landing page would prompt donors to confirm the unsubscription. In Experi-
ment II we used the landing page to gather survey information about why donors unsubscribe, thus
complementing the experimental treatments. The landing page therefore presented unsubscribers
with five radio buttons; four possible reasons for unsubscribing and an Other choice, allowing
them to specify a reason. Two of the stated reasons were generic and allowed donors do express
a general lack of interest in the charity and newsletter (“ I no longer want to give to DCA” and “I
don’t find the content of the newsletter interesting”). The other two reasons provided information
about the role of annoyance (“DCA sends me too many e-mails”) and perceived pushiness of the
charity (“I don’t like to be asked directly to donate to DCA”) in the unsubscription decision. Un-
subscribers were asked to choose one of the five options provided and confirm the unsubscription.
16The physical “food share” was an illustrated sheet of paper. If donors were not interested in receiving the physical
share, they could opt out and make a “regular” donation to the project. In our sample, 78 percent of the donors received
the physical share. None of the explanatory variables we have in our data significantly explain opting out of receiving
a share in a probit regression (results available on request).
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Table 1: Summary statistics and covariates balance
Experiment I Experiment II
Control I Targeted Control II Low Future
Reminder Frequency Benefit
Female (share) 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63
(0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) ( 0.48)
Age (years) 46 46 38 38 38
(15) (15) (15) (15) (15)
City (share) 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.35
(0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Amount donated last time (DKK) 300 313 191 194 192
(622) (553) (408) (419) (516)
Number of months since last donation 35 35 32 32 31
(19) (19) (22) (22) (22)
Number of months on e-mail list 1 1 24 24 24
(-) (-) (5.5) (5.5) (5.5)
Observations 8,692 8,699 14,536 14,527 14,528
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations (in brackets). The variable city is a dummy for the 10 biggest
cities in Denmark. For Experiment I (Experiment II) information on city is available for 99% (87%) of the sample,
gender for 83% (89%), age for 41% (70%), and past donations for 88% (76%) of the sample. The number of months
on the e-mail list was at most 27 months in Experiment II. By definition it was equal to one month in Experiment I.
On the next page the unsubscription was confirmed, and a link to the general homepage of the
charity was provided.
5 Reduced-form results
We first present the results on giving and unsubscriptions from Experiment I before presenting
the results from Experiment II. An overview of the response rates and total observations for the
two experiments is provided in Table 2. The experiments have similar donation rates, but there
is a relatively large drop in the unsubscription rate from Experiment I to Experiment II which we
discuss further in section 5.2.1. The average amount donated is similar across the two experiments
although the causes supported by the two experiments are different.
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Table 2: Experiment I and II: Results statistics
Experiment I Experiment II
All Control I Targeted All Control II Low Future
Reminder Frequency Benefit
Responses (in %)
Percentage who gave 0.44 0.35 0.53 0.66 0.65 0.67 0.65(6.6) (5.9) (7.3) (8.1) (8.0) (8.2) (8.0)
Percentage who unsubscribed 2.90 2.14 3.67 0.38 0.49 0.30 0.36(16.8) (14.5) (18.8) (6.9) (7.0) (5.5) (5.9)
Observations (N)
Full sample 17,391 8,692 8,699 43,489 14,501 14,494 14,494
Number of people who gave 76 30 46 285 94 97 94
Number of unsubscribers 504 186 318 167 71 44 52
Notes: The table provides means and standard deviations (in brackets).
5.1 Experiment I: The effect of a targeted reminder
Our model provides a number of predictions regarding giving, timing of giving, and unsubscription
behavior in Experiment I. We discuss the evidence for each of these predictions in turn.
5.1.1 The reminder increases the number of donations
Figure 2 shows that the share of donors with positive donations in the Targeted Reminder treatment
is larger than that in the Control I treatment (0.53% and 0.35%, respectively), which is in line with
Prediction 1. This is a significant increase of about two-thirds (p-value = 0.066). In addition, Table
3 provides the results of probit regressions on the likelihood of donating. The treatment effect is
similar in sign and magnitude when including individual specific controls but insignificant. We
find that age has a significant positive effect on donating, while the probability of donating is
negatively related to the amount of time that has passed since the last donation was made. We
do not see any significant effect of gender, place of living, or the most recent amount donated
on the probability of donating. Thus, we replicate the findings of Huck and Rasul (2010) that
reminders can increase donations on the extensive margin. When it comes to the intensive margin,
we see a slight increase in the amount donated, conditional on donating, for people in the Targeted
Reminder group compared to the Control I group as shown in Figure 2. However, this increase is
not significant and does not hold in a regression analysis of the amount donated unconditional on
donating (see Table A1 in the appendix).
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Table 3: Donation decisions in Experiment I and II
Experiment I Experiment II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Targeted Reminder 0.00184∗ 0.00269
(0.00100) (0.00195)
Low Frequency 0.00021 0.00006
(0.00095) (0.00091)
Future Benefit 0.00000 -0.00006
(0.00095) (0.0009)
Female 0.00131 0.00198∗∗∗
(0.00193) (0.00074)
Age 0.00015∗∗ 0.00026∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00002)
City 0.00058 0.00319∗∗∗
(0.00214) (0.00093)
Months since last donated -0.00027∗∗∗ -0.00005∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00002)
Amount last donated -0.00000 0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00005)
Months on e-mail list -0.00018∗∗∗
(0.00000)
Observations 17,391 6,448 43,592 27,220
Pseudo R2 0.004 0.046 0.000 0.079
Notes: The table provides the marginal effects and standard errors in brackets of
probit regressions on the binary donation choice. The variables Targeted Reminder,
Low Frequency, and Future Benefit are dummy variables that are evaluated in
comparison to their respective control groups (control dummies are set to zero).
Female and City are dummy variables. Months since last donated and Amount last
donated correspond to the last donation prior to the respective experiment through
any channel. Months on e-mail list is set at one month for everyone in the first
experiment.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2: Giving and unsubscription behavior in Experiment I
Notes: Panel A illustrates the rate of giving and unsubscribing with confidence intervals. Panel B shows the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the amount donated conditional on giving. There are 30 and 46 donors in Control I and
Targeted Reminder, respectively. The corresponding number or unsubscribers is 186 and 318, respectively. Difference
in rate of giving is significant at 10% level (Pearson chi2(1) = 3.3703, p-value = 0.066, Fisher’s exact = 0.084) and
the difference in unsubscription rate is significant at 1% level (Pearson chi2(1) = 35.4939, p-value = 0.000, Fisher’s
exact = 0.000). The differences in distribution of amounts between the treatments are not significant using a Mann-
Whitney test (p-values > 0.62), and neither do we find a significant difference in a two-sided two-sample t-test or a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
We find further support for Prediction 1 when looking at the timing of the donations. Prediction
1 says that the probability of donating around the time of the reminder is higher in the Targeted
Reminder group than in the Control I group. Figure 3 shows that the donations are made either
on the day or the day after the initial solicitation mail or the reminder, and we only see donations
around the time of the reminder in the Targeted Reminder group. Hence, donations are not made
close to the deadline. The results suggest that receivers have a very low rate of natural recall and
are unlikely to make a donation without being reminded.
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Figure 3: Timing of giving in Experiment I
Notes: The figure shows the percentage of donations made on each day in the Control I and Targeted Reminder groups.
The initial e-mail was sent on May 28th, and the reminder was sent on June 4th. The deadline for donating was June
7th. Data for timing of unsubscriptions is not available for Experiment I.
5.1.2 The reminder increases the number of unsubscriptions
Figure 2 documents a large treatment difference in unsubscription behavior.17 The Targeted Re-
minder is associated with a higher unsubscription rate of 3.7% compared to an unsubscription rate
of 2.1% in Control I. This is a difference of about 76%, it is highly significant (p-value = 0.000),
and it is in line with Prediction 2. In the regression analysis provided in Table 4, we find that this
effect is robust to the inclusion control variables. Including all controls, the reminder increases
the likelihood of unsubscribing by 1.1 percentage points compared to Control I. We further find
some evidence that women are significantly less likely to unsubscribe from the mailing list, as
are individuals who are older. The place of living and the amount last donated have no effect on
unsubscriptions.
5.2 Experiment II: Effects of changing the option value
We now present the results from Experiment II which change the option value of subscribing in
two treatments. Here we test whether people account for the option value of subscribing when
making their unsubscription decision as predicted by our model.
17Data on unsubscriptions is only available for the treatment period, and we only have information on unsubscrip-
tions through the links in the e-mails sent out as part of this experiment.
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Table 4: Unsubscriptions in Experiment I and II
Experiment I Experiment II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Targeted Reminder 0.01516∗∗∗ 0.01114∗∗∗
(0.00254) (0.00398)
Low Frequency -0.00186∗∗ -0.00192∗∗
(0.00074) (0.00081)
Future Benefit -0.00131∗ -0.00039
(0.00076) (0.00091)
Female -0.01804∗∗∗ 0.00027
(0.00444) (0.00083)
Age -0.00035∗∗ -0.00003
(0.00014) (0.00003)
City 0.00645 -0.00001
(0.00445) (0.00086)
Months since last donated -0.00022∗ -0.00001
(0.00011) (0.00002)
Amount last donated 0.00000 -0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Months on e-mail list -0.00015∗∗
(0.00007)
Observations 17391 6448 43489 27053
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.023 0.003 0.014
Notes: The table shows the marginal effects and standard errors in brackets of probit
regressions on unsubscribing. The variables Targeted Reminder, Low Frequency, and
Future Benefit are dummy variables that are evaluated in comparison to their respec-
tive control groups (controls are set to zero). Female and City are dummy variables.
Months since last donated and Amount last donated correspond to the last donation
prior to the respective experiment through any channel. Months on e-mail list is set
at one month for everyone in the first experiment. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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5.2.1 A lower frequency of messages reduces the unsubscription rate
In line with Prediction 4 from our model, the Low Frequency treatment reduces the unsubscription
rate from 0.49% to 0.30% (see Figure 4).18 That is a reduction of 39%. The probit regressions in
Table 4 show that the announcement of the reduced frequency has a significant effect on the un-
subscription rate. Including all controls, individuals in the Low Frequency treatment are 0.17-0.20
percentage points less likely to unsubscribe then donors in the Control II treatment. The coefficient
of the Future Benefit treatment goes in the direction implied by the model, i.e., Prediction 3. We
find a marginally significant effect on the unsubscriptions compared to the Control II treatment,
but this effect is not robust to the inclusion of controls. Contrary to Experiment I, we find no effect
of gender, age, or place of living on unsubscribing. This could be due to the sample size, but also
to the particular good that was solicited for. The most recent donation has no measurable effect on
unsubscribing, but the seniority of a donor reduces the probability of unsubscribing significantly,
although the effect is small compared to the effect of the Low Frequency treatment dummy.
Surprisingly, the unsubscription rate is far lower than that in Experiment I. When we compare
the unsubscription rates of our experiments with the rates the charity observed for some of their
other campaigns, we find that Experiment I is at the upper range of unsubscription rates and Exper-
iment II at the lower range. Appendix Figure A1 shows the trend in the unsubscription rate over the
past two years since Experiment I. The rates have been constantly declining, with no visible dif-
ference between donation request e-mails and other newsletters. Since the e-mails of Experiment
I were some of the first e-mails the donors received, individuals who dislike newsletters may have
reacted to that first e-mail and left the mailing list by the time we ran Experiment II. Nevertheless,
there is a constant stream of unsubscriptions every time the charity sends out an e-mail, and these
subscribers are not just the most recent people joining the list (although being on the list for a
longer time significantly reduces the propensity to unsubscribe). To ensure that the lower unsub-
scription rate in the second experiment is not explained by a more difficult unsubscription process
in Experiment II due to the attached survey question, we note that the number of donors who click
on the unsubscribe link (which was identical in the two experiments) in Experiment II is 222, and
167 ultimately unsubscribe. While some people seem to change their mind after clicking the link
18To measure the reaction to the reminder in a clean way, we only analyze behavior within the first three days of
receiving the solicitation. This is the time frame in which most unsubscriptions are carried out, and it helps reduce
the noise created by other reminders or motivations for unsubscribing such as cleaning up the inbox after summer
vacation. Ideally, we would like to measure the response immediately after sending the message such that behavior
(for some people) is not the result of several shocks to the weight on warm-glow utility.
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to unsubscribe, this cannot explain the far lower unsubscription rate compared to Experiment I.
Figure 4: Giving and unsubscription behavior in Experiment II
Notes: Panel A illustrates the rate of giving and unsubscribing with confidence intervals. Panel B shows the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the amount donated conditional on giving. There are 94, 97, and 94 donors in the
Control II, Low Frequency, and Future Benefit treatments, respectively. The corresponding numbers of unsubscribers
are 71, 44, and 52, respectively. The differences in rate of giving are not significant. The difference in unsubscription
rates between Control II and Low Frequency is significant at 1% level (Pearson Chi2(1) = 6.35 (p-value = 0.01),
between Control II and Future Benefit at the 10% level (Pearson chi2(1) = 2.94 (p-value=0.09)), and between Low
Frequency and Future Benefit are not significant (Pearson chi2(1)=0.67 (p-value 0.41)). The differences in distribution
of amounts between the treatments are not significant using a Mann-Whitney test (p-values > 0.48), nor do we find a
significant difference in a two-sided two-sample t-test or a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
For Experiment II, we have information on the timing of the unsubscriptions (see Appendix
Figure A2). Most unsubscriptions happen as an immediate reaction to the e-mail (within the first
3 days). There are no visible treatment differences between the timing of the unsubscriptions.
Around 70 percent of all unsubscriptions happen on the day the e-mail is sent out.
5.2.2 The option value does not influence giving
In Table 3 we show that the treatments have no significant effect on the decision to give, which is
consistent with Prediction 5. When considering the average amount donated, we find no significant
effect of the treatments (see Appendix Table A1). The effects of the controls are roughly consistent
with the results of Experiment I.
24
As in the first experiment, we find that most donations are made on the day the e-mail is sent
out or the following day (see Appendix Figure A2). This shows that giving is either an immediate
reaction to the solicitation or otherwise forgotten.
6 Structural estimation
Our reduced form results are consistent with all five predictions from our general model (at least
in terms of directional effects) and provide suggestive evidence of a cost to potential donors for
receiving reminders. To obtain a more precise estimate of this cost and to conduct a welfare
analysis, we next consider a more specific version of our model which permits estimation of the
structural parameters.
The version of our model considered in this section is given by v(git) = log(1+git) and c(git) =
git .19 We allow for individual specific heterogeneity through ait , where εit follows a truncated
normal distribution with mean 0 and σ2 variance on the interval [−M;M] with M arbitrarily large,
implying that εit effectively is normally distributed. We also let pt = 1, meaning that the charity
sends a message in every period, and we let a period correspond to one month.20 To capture the
lack of giving in some periods in the data (see below), we set the probability of remembering
without being reminded to zero, i.e., θ = 0. Finally, the monthly discount rate is calibrated to
δ = 0.99835 which corresponds to an annual real interest rate of 2%.
6.1 Solving the model
For this version of our model, we have g∗it = argmaxgit≥0(ait log(1+ git)− git), which implies
g∗it = ait − 1 for all ait > 1 and g∗it = 0 otherwise. Hence, g∗it(ait) = max(0,ait − 1) and a¯ = 1,
meaning that people with a realization of ait greater than one donate a positive amount.
Given the donation rule, the unsubscription decision is derived from an optimal stopping prob-
19The assumptions of log warm-glow utility and a cost of giving proportional to the amount donated are similar to
those made in DellaVigna et al. (2012).
20A monthly timing is natural for the following reasons: i) at the time of Experiment II, messages were sent approx-
imately monthly, ii) potential donors were informed of the monthly frequency in Experiment II, and iii) we observe
some donors donating monthly or approximately monthly but very rarely observe more frequent donations. There are
a few cases of donors making several donations on the same day. This is likely to be caused by people purchasing
multiple charity “items” through the charity’s website. We treat these as one donation.
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lem.21 Solving the optimal stopping problem is complicated by serial correlation in the unobserv-
able state variable ait , continuity of our state variable, and by the fact that the value function for
the optimization problem depends non-linearly on ait and its future values. This implies that we
cannot obtain a closed form recursive expression for the unsubscription threshold at . Instead, the
solution is approximated using backwards induction, where conditional expectations are evaluated
by Monte Carlo integration. Here, we use a relatively large number of draws S = 3,000,000 to
accurately capture unsubscription and donation behavior, which are given by extremely low and
high realizations of ait , respectively.
6.2 Data for structural estimation
We use data from the Control II treatment in Experiment II because the frequency of messages
was well-established by the time of Experiment II, and we fixed the beliefs of the donors at the
correct frequency. The data is further restricted to individuals for whom historical donation data
is available, giving a total of N = 12,470 individuals. We observe donation behavior for T = 54
periods prior to the treatment period for Experiment II and until two periods after the treatment
period.
Our data contains individual level information about amounts donated and the timing of giving.
Figure 5 displays the share of people in our sample that gave a positive amount by each month,
excluding donations made by Direct Debit and cash donations. All past Direct Debit donations
are excluded to ensure comparability across time as our experimental sample does not include
people with a Direct Debit at the time of the experiment.22 We observe large spikes in giving in
December every year, which most likely capture additional giving due to Christmas and the end
of the tax year. In addition, we observed spikes around the 2011 famine in East Africa and the
2015 earthquake in Nepal. Figure 5 also shows the time series for the average amount donated
conditional on donating.
21Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010), and Rust (1994) provide reviews of solution and
estimation methods for dynamic stochastic discrete choice models including optimal stopping problems.
22Cash donations for example from street solicitations or door-to-door fundraisers are not linked to donors in the
database and hence cannot be included in the analysis.
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Figure 5: Donation behavior over time
Notes: Based on Experiment II sample. The figure excludes payments made using Direct Debit or cash.
6.3 Estimation methodology
To present our estimation approach let γ ′1 = (µ,σ ,ρ) and γ2 = Λ with γ = (γ
′
1,γ2)
′. This decom-
position of our structural parameters is adopted because γ 1 contains parameters in the process for
the weight on warm-glow that can be identified solely from historical donation data independently
of the donor’s planning horizon T , whereas the annoyance cost in γ2 must be identified from un-
subscription data and therefore depends on the planning horizon. To facilitate comparisons of γ2
for different planning horizons and hence interpretation of γ2, we first estimate γ 1 using historical
data prior to the treatment period, and then identify γ2 from the unsubscription behavior in the
treatment period given our estimate of γ 1.
6.3.1 Step 1: Estimation of γ 1
Estimation of γ 1 is complicated by the fact that ait is unobserved, and we therefore use the method
of simulated moments (MSM) following McFadden (1989).
The considered moments are: i) the probability of not giving P(git = 0), ii) the probability of
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giving 100 DKK or less P(0 < git ≤ 100), iii) the probability of giving between 100 DKK and 200
DKK P(100 < git ≤ 200), iv) the probability of giving between 200 DKK and 400 DKK P(200 <
git ≤ 400), v) the probability of giving between 400 DKK and 600 DKK P(400 < git ≤ 600), vi)
a measure of the auto-covariance in giving E(gitgit−1).23 Our last moment is required to identify
the persistence ρ in the process for ait . These six empirical moments are stored in m1(git). The
corresponding model moments E[m1(γ 1)] are computed by simulating donation data forT periods
across pi1N individuals, where pi1 = 10 is the scaling factor controlling the number of simulations.
The estimation is carried out using the standard procedure where the weighting matrix W =
diag(S−1mean) in a preliminary step to obtain γ˜ 1 with Smean denoting the variance of
1
NT ∑
N
i=1∑
T
t=1 m1(git)
when re-centered around their sample means. Our final estimate γˆ 1 is then obtained using the
optimal weighting matrix Wˆ = (S˜)−1, where S˜ denotes the variance of the moments when re-
centered around E[m1(γ˜ 1)]. In both cases the variances are obtained by the Newey-West estimator
using 12 lags. As shown by McFadden (1989), γˆ 1 is asymptotically normal for N → ∞ with
V̂ar [γˆ 1] =
1
NT
(
1+ 1pi1
)(
Gˆ
′
Wˆ Gˆ
)−1
, where Gˆ = 1pi1NT ∑
T
t=1∑
pi1N
s=1
∂m(γˆ 1 ,gs)
∂γ ′1
.
6.3.2 Step 2: Estimation of γ2
To estimate γ2 we condition on γˆ 1, impute starting values for ait from the unconditional distri-
bution, and determine γˆ2 using MSM with the unsubscription rate P(ui = 1) serving as our only
moment. Our setting is therefore just identified, making the weighting matrix redundant. We let
m2(ui) denote the empirical moment and E[m2(γ1, γˆ 1)] the model-implied moment. The latter is
computed using Monte Carlo integration as described above.
This estimator of γ2 is also asymptotically normal, but its asymptotic variance is complicated
by the estimation of γˆ 1 in the first step. Using the standard procedure to account for such nuisance
parameters, it follows that the asymptotic variance of γ2 may be estimated by24
Var [γˆ2] =
1
N
(
1+
1
pi2
)
(Aˆ)−1Var [ f (γˆ2,ui; γˆ 1)] (Aˆ)
−1+(Aˆ)−1FˆVar [γˆ 1] Fˆ
′
(Aˆ)−1 (2)
where pi2 is a scaling factor controlling the number of simulations in the second estimation step.
Here Aˆ ≡ 1pi2N ∑
pi2N
s=1
∂m(γˆ2,us;γˆ 1)
∂γ1
, Fˆ ≡ 1pi2N ∑
pi2N
s=1
∂m(γˆ2,us;γˆ 1)
∂γ ′1
, and V̂ar [ f (γˆ2,ui; γˆ 1)] denotes the vari-
23To avoid perfect linearity between the chosen moments and hence insure full rank of the Jacobian ∂m1∂γ 1 , we do not
include the probability of giving more than 600 DKK P(git > 600) in the matched moments.
24The derivations are deferred to the Supplementary Appendix.
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ance of 1N ∑
N
i=1 m2(ui) when re-centered around E[m2(γˆ2; γˆ 1)]. The first term of Equation (2) rep-
resents the standard variance from MSM, whereas the second term accounts for estimation uncer-
tainty about γˆ 1 from our first step.
6.4 Structural estimates
Table 5 shows that our model matches the low propensity to give in the empirical data and the
empirical distribution of giving in different ranges quite well. However, we underestimate the
probability of giving between 100 DKK and 200 DKK (0.0040 in the data vs. 0.0029 based on the
model), and we overestimate the autocorrelation in the data (35.9 in the data vs. 40.9 implied by
our model).
The unconditional mean of ait is estimated to µ = −1,274 and the standard deviation σ to
704. The low mean captures the fact that on average across the pre-treatment period 98.79% of
individuals did not donate in any given month. Hence, a large share of the distribution of a is below
the donation threshold a¯. At the same time the distribution of a must capture the tendency that
people most frequently give between 100 and 200 DKK conditional on donating. We note that the
model implies that potential donors get zero donation utility if they do not give a strictly positive
amount. Hence, a negative value of a does not translate into negative utility. We estimate the
persistence in the process for a to 0.22, suggesting that the warm-glow parameter in the previous
period has a modest but statistically significant positive effect on current period warm-glow.
The estimate of the annoyance cost Λ depends on the planning horizon T of the donors. When
T = 12, donors have a one year horizon, and we estimate the annoyance cost to 12.95 DKK ('
$2.35). This is quite similar in magnitude to the social pressure cost estimated in DellaVigna et al.
(2012). The average hourly wage in Denmark was DKK 243 in 2012 (Danmarks Statistik, 2013)
meaning that the annoyance cost equals about 5% of the average hourly wage.
Figure 6 illustrates how the estimated annoyance cost varies with the planning horizon T . The
estimates increase sharply until T ' 10 after which it stabilizes at about 14 DKK. This suggests
that there is little difference in the estimates for planning horizons beyond a year (T = 12).
Intuitively, the positive relationship between the planning horizon and the estimated annoyance
cost can be explained as follows. If the potential donor has a very short planning horizon (i.e. T
small), the option value of subscribing is small, because there are few future periods in which he
could get a high realization of ait and hence be generous enough to give. Hence, the potential donor
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Table 5: Structural estimates
Estimated parameters
Model parameters
Mean weight on warm-glow, µ -1,274.48(19.211)
Auto correlation in warm-glow, ρ 0.22( 0.001)
Std.dev. of warm-glow error term, σ 704.49(19.211)
Annoyance cost, Λ, when T = 12 12.95
(0.805)
Model moments Empirical moments
Step 1:
P(git = 0) 0.9885 0.9879
P(0 < git ≤ 100) 0.0036 0.0031
P(100 < git ≤ 200) 0.0026 0.0040
P(200 < git ≤ 400) 0.0030 0.0029
P(400 < git ≤ 600) 0.0014 0.0012
E(gitgit−1) 40.930 35.906
N 249,380a 12,469
T 54 54
Step 2:
P(ui = 1) 0.0050 0.0050
N 3,000,000a 12,469
Notes: The upper part of the table reports estimated parameters with standard errors in brackets. The
bottom part of the table reports model-implied and empirical moments. Empirical moments are calculated
for individuals in Control II for whom data on donation history is available. Model-implied moments are
calculated from simulated data. a) reports the total number of simulations, i.e., Npi .
will be relatively more likely to unsubscribe, and a relatively low annoyance cost Λ is needed to
explain the unsubscription rate in our data. On the other hand, if the potential donor has a long
planning horizon, the option value of subscribing is larger because there are more periods in which
the individual can potentially get a high enough realization of ait to make a donation. In this case
a relatively high value of Λ is needed to explain the empirical unsubscription rate.
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Figure 6: Estimated annoyance cost Λ as a function of the planning horizon T
Notes: The solid line shows estimates of the annoyance cost Λ in DKK for different planning horizons T . The shaded
area illustrates the 95% confidence interval for the point estimates.
7 Welfare implications of reminders
This section conducts a welfare analysis to quantify the relative size of the costs and benefits of
reminders. We begin by estimating the effect of unsubscribing in Experiment I on giving. These
results and the structural estimates of the model provided in Section 6 are then used in our welfare
analysis.
7.1 Effect of unsubscribing on giving behavior
The first question we want to address is whether the charity loses valuable donors through unsub-
scriptions. If only marginal donors or individuals who donate just as much without a reminder
unsubscribe, then a high frequency of reminders is not problematic and might even be desirable
for the charity. For the sample in Experiment I we have access to donation data including amount
and time of giving for a reasonably long period before and after the treatment period. This makes a
difference-in-difference analysis of donation behavior for subscribers and unsubscribers possible.
Since unsubscribing only means that donors switch off one communication channel, it is pos-
sible that unsubscribers will donate even after they have unsubscribed. As illustrated by the time
series in Figure 7, unsubscribers appear to be relatively more marginal donors in terms of giving
than subscribers both before and after the treatment month. The difference-in-difference analy-
sis in Table 6 confirms this result as unsubscribers are less likely to give, and the unconditional
average amount given per month is smaller for unsubscribers than subscribers in both the pre-
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and post-treatment period. However, the differences in the amounts donated are not statistically
significant.
The likelihood of donating decreases for both subscribers and unsubscribers from the pre-
treatment period to the post-treatment period, and this results appears to be largely driven by a
drop in donations around Christmas (Figure 7). The decrease in Christmas giving appears larger
for the unsubscribers than for the subscribers, and overall we find a larger drop in the propensity to
give and the unconditional amount given for unsubscribers than for subscribers. The difference-in-
difference estimate of the effect of unsubscribing on the monthly amount donated is 0.62 DKK. For
the propensity to give the corresponding estimate is 0.003 (Table 6). However, these differences
are not statistically significant.25
We note that there may be a couple of reasons why the difference-in-difference estimates are
insignificant. First, a relatively small share of our sample are unsubscribers, and this reduces the
power of our test. Second, the e-mails in the first experiment were among the first e-mails that
individuals in our sample got from the charity and hence represent one of the first opportunities to
unsubscribe. The treatment period may therefore only work as a rather “fuzzy” treatment period in
terms of unsubscriptions because some unsubscribers may have mentally unsubscribed before the
treatment period.
7.2 Welfare of potential donors and the charity
We next evaluate the welfare consequences of sending out a regular e-mail to remind people to
donate, i.e., the welfare effects of the e-mail sent to the control group in Experiment II.26 Poten-
tial donors either give or do not give depending on their realization of ait when they receive the
reminder. Donors with ait < 1 do not give and have a negative utility because they incur the annoy-
ance cost Λ without the warm-glow from giving. Donors with ait > 1 give and receive warm-glow
utility, but they also incur the annoyance cost. Overall potential donors might incur positive or
negative utility from receiving the e-mail. Conditional on giving in response to the message, the
welfare of the donor is 723 DKK on average (see Table 7). For individuals who do not give, the
25Unsubscribers in the the Targeted Reminder and Control I treatments are not different in their likelihood of giving
in any period (results available on request). Hence, we do not have evidence to suggest that unsubscribers in the
Targeted Reminder treatment are more or less marginal on average than unsubscribers to the first e-mail.
26We consider the effect of reminders in Control II because the communication this group received was closest to
the usual communication sent by the charity.
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Figure 7: Share donating per month by unsubsciption behavior in Experiment I
Note: Based on Experiment I sample and including only individuals for whom we have donation history (14,995
subscribers and 458 unsubscribers, i.e., 93.1% of the sample). Data covers the period 1 Jan 2011 - 31 Mar 2015.
Table 6: Analysis of propensity to give and unconditional amount donated
Subscribers Unsubscribers DIDa DID
(1) (2) (1)-(2) with controlsa,b
Propensity to give per month
Pre-period 0.024 0.016 -0.008*
(0.086) (0.021) (0.004)
Post-period 0.018 0.007 -0.011**
(0.098) (0.042) 0.004
Change in propensity to give -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.003 -0.006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011)
Unconditional amount given DKK/month
Pre-period 7.78 6.71 -1.07
(0.24) (0.93) (1.44)
Post-period 5.15 3.46 -1.69
(0.27) (1.80) (1.44)
Change in mean amount given -2.63*** -3.25 -0.62 -1.39
(0.35) (2.02) (2.04) (3.82)
Notes: The table reports means and standard errors (in brackets). Includes Experiment I sample only and only the
93.1% percent of the sample we have donation history for. Data covers the periods 1 Jan 2011 - 31 Mar 2015. The
treatment period was Jun 2013. a means and standard errors are estimated by linear regression with data collapsed
into one pre-treatment and one post-treatment period. We use one pre- and one post-treatment period to address
concerns about reliable estimation of standard errors as discussed by Bertrand et al. (2004). b the regression includes
the following controls: age, female dummy, number of months since last donation, and amount donated last time.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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welfare is -12.95 DKK. On average 1.53% of donors give in a given month. Hence, in expectation
the message diminishes the welfare of potential donors by 1.69 DKK.
For the charity there is a positive immediate effect of sending the e-mail which is equivalent
to the additional amount raised, but there is also a long-term cost of lost future donations from
unsubscribers. We use the difference-in-difference results in Table 6 to quantify the potential long-
term effects and estimate that the charity looses 0.62 DKK per unsubscriber per month. The net
effect for the charity depends on how strongly the charity discounts future periods and for how
many periods donations are lost. In our setting, unsubscribing is an absorbing state, i.e., once
people have unsubscribed they cannot rejoin the list with the same e-mail address. We therefore
assume that the effect lasts for the remaining lifetime of the potential donors. Since the negative
effects of unsubscribing for the charity occurs over future periods, the net effect depends on the
charity’s discount rate. We show results for discount rates of 2%, 10%, and 20%. The net effect
for the charity is generally small but positive - for instance 1 DKK for a discount rate of 10%.
Our results suggest that the negative welfare effect for potential donors is greater than the net
effect for the charity. This holds even if the negative long-term effects for the charity are set to
zero. Hence, the money raised by the charity must be used very efficiently to generate positive
welfare effects.27
Table 7: Welfare effect of a regular fund-raising e-mail
Potential donors
Welfare conditional on giving 722.69
Percentage of potential donors who give (%) 1.53
Welfare conditional on not giving -12.95
Expected welfare effect per contacted individual -1.69
Charity
Charity discount rate (%) 2% 10% 20%
Immediate effect: Money raised per potential donor 1.38 1.38 1.38
Long-term effect: Money lost per potential donor 1.13 0.38 0.20
Net fund-raiser effect per contacted individual 0.25 1.00 1.18
Notes: Figures are in DKK unless otherwise stated. Long-term effects for the charity are
assumed to last for the remaining lifetime of the potential donors. On average donors in
the sample are 38 years old and have a life expectancy of 86 years.
27This could be achieved if we make the assumption that a dollar given to a poor person in a developing country or
invested in necessary infrastructure creates larger welfare effects than the welfare the same dollar could have created
in the pocket of a potential donor (Singer, 2009).
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An important caveats to our analysis is that our estimates do not account for wider effects
which may be either positive or negative. For example, there may be a substitution effect implying
that unsubscribers do not donate less in total after unsubscribing but instead substitute donations
to another charity. This would bias upwards the welfare calculations. However, complementary
effects might also arise where potential donors start paying less attention to the content of messages
and reminders when they receive more of them. This could have negative welfare consequences as
it reduces the positive effect of reminders and increases the annoyance costs.
One obvious remedy reducing annoyance costs is a better allocation of reminders. Rather
than sending e-mails to every donor, the charity could provide donors with an opportunity to self-
select into the reminder. This could however lead to very low sign-up rates due to inertia. So a
default enrollment is preferred (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). As is common in fundraising, our
sample of individuals had consented to the charity storing their e-mail address when they made a
donation. A better solution than an opt-in could be to allow individuals to adjust the frequency of
the newsletter. As donations spike around Christmas and New Year, some individuals might only
want to be reminded around Christmas to give. Alternatively, the charity could use the available
giving data of the donors to predict when certain individuals are most likely to give and send
targeted reminders at those points.28 The availability of more detailed data through an increase in
online giving could make this a feasible strategy for charities and organizations in the near future.
On the other hand, natural catastrophes or crises do not follow a predicable pattern. A large crisis
such as a hurricane could create an external shock to a person’s ait , which would make him willing
to make a donation at another time of the year than what would be predicted by past donation
behavior. Nevertheless, a more precisely targeted approach to fundraising would help balance the
social welfare costs.29
28Allcott and Kessler (2015) have a similar discussion for the opt-in into Home Energy Reports (HERs) and for
sending targeted reports based on the customers willingness to pay for HERs.
29The literature on optimal catalog mailings (among others Simester et al. (2006); Go¨nu¨l and Shi (1998); Go¨nu¨l
and Hofstede (2006)) has also advocated that companies should take long run implications into account. Papers in this
tradition argue that companies might be able to increase profits by incurring the immediate cost of mailing a catalog
to recipients who are not expected to make a purchase in the short term because some recipients can be expected to
purchase in the longer term. However, our argument is that one might then overlook the long run annoyance costs to
the recipient which leads to loss of consumer base for the advertiser.
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8 Conclusion
This paper documents the hidden costs of nudging in the context of reminders to subscribers on a
charity’s mailing list. Our results show that reminders increase the number of donations and at the
same time increase the number of unsubscriptions from the mailing list. We explore the reasons
for unsubscribing in a theoretical model which we then test in a second field experiment. Based on
data from the second experiment, we also structurally estimate the annoyance costs and the utility
of giving. Finally, we conduct a welfare analysis from the perspective of the subscribers and for
the charity. We find that the annoyance cost of a reminder is about 13 DKK each month, and on
average a reminder is welfare diminishing for potential donors. Furthermore, when accounting
for the long-term effects of unsubscriptions on giving, the net effect for the charity of sending a
reminder is just 1 DKK.
The model we develop and test experimentally in this paper could be extended to other settings
were reminders are used to tackle inattention or procrastination. Instead of warm-glow from do-
nating, the benefits could be improved health, savings, or academic outcomes. It is easy to see that
the higher the personal benefit of the reminder and the smaller the cost of the prompted action, the
larger the utility from the reminder, irrespective of the potential annoyance costs. However, high
frequency or very pushy reminders create a welfare diminishing cost even in these settings.
Concluding, we recommend that the literature on nudging policies continues to include more
critical evaluations of policies by pricing in the psychological costs of the nudge and unintended
behavioral reactions and include them in the welfare calculations for all affected parties.
Appendices
A Figures and tables
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Table A1: Amount donated unconditionally in Experiment I and II
Experiment I Experiment II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Targeted Reminder 0.42196 0.61872
(0.31184) (0.69962)
Low Frequency -0.24689 -0.37584
(0.25171) (0.28892)
Future Benefit -0.26455 -0.31816
(0.25335) (0.30103)
Female 0.38122 0.39175∗
(0.88231) (0.23077)
Age 0.04882∗ 0.08134∗∗∗
(0.02570) (0.01078)
City -0.01183 0.70983∗∗∗
(0.59964) (0.24663)
Months since last donated -0.04957∗∗∗ -0.01337∗
(0.01594) (0.00753)
Amount last donated 0.00099 0.00098∗∗
(0.00105) (0.00041)
Months on e-mail list -0.09101∗∗∗
(0.03329)
Constant 0.62701∗∗∗ -0.09647 1.37191∗∗∗ 0.47054
(0.20449) (1.29571) (0.21369) (0.82847)
Observations 17391 6448 43489 27053
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Notes: The table shows OLS regressions on the amount donated unconditional on donating
with standard errors in parentheses. Targeted Reminder, Low Frequency, and Future Benefit
are dummy variables that are evaluated in comparison to their respective control groups.
Female and City are dummy variables. Months since last donated and Amount last donated
correspond to the last donation prior to the respective experiment through any channel.
Months on e-mail list is set at one month for everyone in the first experiment. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure A1: Unsubscription rates over time
Notes: The percentage of potential donors who clicked on the unsubscription link
in a random selection of previous e-mails.
Figure A2: Timing of giving and unsubscriptions in Experiment II
Notes: The figure shows the percentage of donations and unsubscriptions made on each day in the Control II,
the Low Frequency, and the Future Benefit treatments. The e-mail was sent on July 9th for all three groups.
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Figure A3: Experiment I: First fundraising e-mail
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Figure A4: Experiment II: Control July 2015 e-mail
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B Reasons for unsubscribing
From the landing page for unsubscribers in Experiment II, we gather some indicative information
on why individuals unsubscribe from the mailing list. Figure B1 provides information on reasons
for unsubscribing and shows answers given on the unsubscription page for the three treatments
combined.30 The most common reason for unsubscribing is that recipients do not want to give
to the charity anymore, followed by a dislike of being asked directly for a donation and “Other”
reasons.31 The second most frequently chosen reason is that DCA sends out too many e-mails.
Clearly we observe self-selection into answering the questions as a result of unsubscribing. Less
people unsubscribed in the Low Frequency treatment, which means that we observe a smaller group
of unsubscribers, who answer this question. Therefore, we cannot make any causal inference from
the data, but just use it as a glimpse into why individuals unsubscribe from the mailing list. In
section C we compare the reasons given in Experiment II to those given in the next solicitation
e-mail.
C Medium term effects of Experiment II
Four weeks after we ran Experiment II, on the 14th of August 2015, we sent out the announced
matching opportunity to all individuals who had been part of Experiment II, except those who had
unsubscribed. This mailing had been announced to the individuals in the Future Benefit treatment,
but to the other two treatment groups it came as a surprise. This e-mail took the upcoming school
start in Denmark as a reason to ask subscribers for a donation of a school bench worth 200 DKK
to some of the world’s poorest children. For one week, until the 20th of August, we added a
matching gift consisting of a school meal (worth 20 DKK) to a poor child for everyone that donated
200 DKK during that period. The second e-mail had the subject line “School start”. Due to the
unsubscriptions from all three groups and the expectations formed by the Future Benefit group
about the content of this e-mail, we have possible self-selection into opening the new mailing. The
following results thus have to be interpreted with the selection effect in mind. They nevertheless
give an insight into medium term effects of the experimental treatments on subsequent behavior.
30We pooled the answers, as there are no significant differences between the treatment regarding the reasons for
unsubscribing.
31Since it was technically impossible to randomize the answer possibilities, the first reason might be slightly over-
stated due to order effects.
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Figure B1: Reasons for unsubscribing in Experiment II
Notes: The figure shows the percentage of each reason given for unsubscribing when combining the three
treatments.
While the response rate in terms of number of donations was lower than in Experiment II, the
average donation conditionally on donating was higher. Forty-eight individuals donated within
three days in response to the mailing (see Table C1). That is 0.14 percent of the total group.
Conditionally on donating the average amount donated was 258 DKK which is higher than in
Experiment II. The differences are likely due to the solicitations being for different public goods
(a food waste shop in Denmark vs. school benches for poor children) and due to a higher focal
amount (in Experiment II this was 100 DKK, and in the subsequent mailing it was 220 DKK). The
unsubscription rate was 0.66 percent and hence slightly higher than in Experiment II.
Mostly, we are interested in whether the treatments in Experiment II had any effects on the
response to the mailing four weeks later. Out of the 259 receivers that unsubscribed after receiving
the mailing, 70 where in the Control II group, 97 in the Future Benefit group, and 90 in the Low
Frequency group. Chi2 tests on the differences reveal that significantly more people from the
Future Benefit treatment than the Control II group unsubscribed in response to the subsequent
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Table C1: Follow-up mailing: Results statistics
All Control II Low Frequency Future Benefit
Responses in (%)
Percentage who gave
0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10
(3.41) (3.52) (3.21) (3.21)
Percentage who unsubscribed
0.60 0.48 0.62 0.67
(7.66) (6.92) (7.84) (8.14)
Observations
Full sample 43,292 14,450 14,428 14,414
Number who gave 48 18 15 15
Number of
unsubscribers
259 70 90 97
Notes: The table provides means and standard deviations (in brackets). The response rates are given in
percent. The table also provides information about the total number of observations in each sample and the
total number of donations.
mailing (Chi2, p-value=0.04). The other differences in unsubscription rates are not significant.32
This result could be due to a higher self-selection into reading the e-mail for individuals in the
Future Benefit group, as the matching opportunity was announced in their e-mail in Experiment
II. A second explanation could be a disappointment because the offered match and the cause does
not meet expectations created in the treatment e-mail. In order to understand which explanation is
more likely, we look at the stated reasons for unsubscribing.
We do not see a difference in the distribution of reasons for unsubscribing between the Future
Benefit and the other two treatments. This lends credibility to the explanation that rather than
being disappointed more individuals in the Future Benefit group took the time to open the e-mail
and formally unsubscribe instead of just deleting it without opening it. In the “Other” comments we
do not observe any reference to the matching possibility or any form of potential disappointment
with the offer. We display the pooled distribution in Figure C1. Overall, it is interesting to note
that again “Dislike being asked” was selected more often than “Too many DCA e-mails”. This
difference actually seems understated as among the “Other” responses several were along the lines
“I decide myself, when I want to give” or “I give when I can, but not when you ask”. Thus, our
results from both solicitations support the “avoiding the ask” theory (Dana et al., 2007; Andreoni
32The p-value for a Chi2 test of differences in the unsubscription rate for the two treatments is 0.61, and the p-value
for a test for difference in unsubscription rates in the Low Frequency and Control II group is 0.11.
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Figure C1: Reasons for unsubscribing in first solicitation after Experiment II
Notes: The figure shows the percentage of each reason given for unsubscribing when combining the three
treatments.
et al., 2011; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Knutsson et al., 2013), but should be interpreted with caution
because of the self-selection.
We do not observe a higher rate of giving for the Future Benefit group, which could have
been expected as a result of more people opening the e-mail. Eighteen individuals of the control
group, 15 of the Future Benefit, and 15 of the Low Frequency treatment donated in this mailing.
Four individuals donated both in Experiment II and in the subsequent campaign, and they were
divided across all the treatments (1/2/1). Since the treatments in Experiment II had no effect on the
number on donations in the experiment, we do not expect a substitution effect in the subsequent
mailing. From the response rate, it is obvious without formal testing that announcing the match in
the treatment e-mail did not have a significant positive effect on subsequent giving. Because of the
already mentioned self-selection issue, we will not go further in our interpretation of the results.
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